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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs -

JACK SYDDALL, JIMMIE JONES, and
KENNETH PERRY,

Case No.
10953

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellants, Jack Syddall, Jimmie Jones, and
Kenneth Perry, were charged with the crime of
burglary in the first degree.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellants were charged in city court and
bound over to the district court for trial. Jury was had
in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis
County on the 21st through 23rd of March, 1967, the
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge, presiding. At
the close of the State's case in chief, the trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of
burglary in the first degree, but a motion on behalf
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of defendants to dismiss the included offenses was
denied. The jury found each of the defendants guilty of the crime of burglary in the second degree. On
March 31, 1967, the defendants, and each of them
were sentenced to the Utah State Prison to serve for
the indeterminate period provided by law.
I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is substantially in agreement with
the statement of facts as set out in appellants' brief.
However, certain improper inferences are drawn
from the facts stated in the record. Appellant claims
that the record clearly indicates that defendants had
no interest in taking anything from the Lockhart
Company (Brief of Appellant, page 3). Respondent
submits that a more accurate statement under the
facts revealed in the record is that the record clearly indicated that, prior to their apprehension, appellants had taken nothing from the Lockhart Company.
Furthermore, the appellants allege that a small vault
that was inside the Lockhart Company was ignored.
The answer here again is that the vault was ignored
up to the time of their apprehension. In view of the
mass of evidence which by appellants' own admission proves that they were perpetrating a felony,
(Brief of Appellants, p. 4), it is wholly unreasonable
to attribute to these appellants an absence of felon-
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ious intent coexistent with the breaking and entering of both Barlow Furniture Company and the
Lockhart Company.
POINT I
APPELLANTS WERE AFFORDED AN ADEQUATE
PRELIMINARY HEARING AND HAD SUFFICIENT
NOTICE OF THE CRIME OF WHICH THEY WERE
ULTIMATELY CONVICTED.

Appellants apparently would argue that some
vague impropriety at the preliminary hearing resulted in their not having notice of the crime of which
they were ultimately convicted. Respondent submits
that this argument is without merit. There had already been two preliminary hearings in this matter
(R. 73 P. 6). At the hearing on the State's motion to
amend the information, the objection was made by
defendants that the amendment to the information
would constitute a change in substance and apparently would prejudice the defendants. The following colloquy then took place between the court and
counsel for defendants:
COURT:
The record may note the objection, Mr. King.
And if there is sufficient concern about a
change in the substance of the crime, or the
substance of the evidence as it applies and the
allegation as it now reads, it may be that the
matter should be remanded for a further preliminary hearing. The court would leave that
course open to the defendants, if you desire to
make such a motion, and will allow you five
days to make the motion.
MR. KING:
There having already been two preliminary
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hearing, as I understand, based on that specific point, I don't think the defendants should
be obligated to incur the time and expense of
another preliminary hearing. So we will make
no further request for further preliminary
hearing, and are prepared at this time to ask
for a trial setting. [R.73 P.6]

From the foregoing, it is clear that defendants
apparently did not feel that the change or the alleged variance in the information was so gross as to
deprive them of notice of the crime of which they
were charged. As the above exchange discloses, the
court offered ample opportunity for defendants to
have a further preliminary hearing and thus apprise
themselves of the nature of the charge. The defendants' refusal to avail themselves thereof necessarily
indicates that they were fully aware of the nature of
the charge and that the objection was frivolous. It is
submitted that defendants' request to proceed with
the trial setting at that time was an absolute waiver
of any objection based on an impropriety at the
preliminary hearing or in the information. Thus, appellants cannot claim at this point that the court's
action, in which they acquiesced, was prejudicial to
them.
POINT II
THE OVERWHELMING MASS OF INCRIMINATING
EVIDENCE IS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY OF THE BARLOW FURNITURE COMPANY AND
THE LOCKHART COMPANY.

The crime of burglary is defined in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-3 (1953), which, in part provides:

)

I

5
Every person who, in the nighttime, forcibly breaks
and enters ... any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building ... with intent to commit
larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the
second degree. [Emphasis Added].

The rule of law applicable in this and in other
jurisdictions having similar statutes1 is that the mere
unauthorized entry in the nighttime of a dwelling
house or other building of another provides the jury
w] th sufficient evidence to infer the intent element,
and will warrant a conviction of second degree
burglary; there is no requirement that a theft must
be proven. See, e. g., State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d
363, 359 P.2d 486 (1961); State v. Winters, 54 Wash.
2d 707, 344 P.2d 526 (1959) (Statutory presumption
that entry was for criminal purpose); People v. Murphy, 173 Cal. App. 2d 367, 343 P.2d 273 (1959); People
v. Guarino, 132 Cal. App. 2d 554, 282 P.2d 538 (1955);
State v. Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (l 958);Ex
parte Seyfried, 74 Idaho 467, 264 P.2d 685 (1953).
As was stated in State v. Tellay, supra at 309,
324 P.2d at 490-491:
1 Cal. Crim. Code § 459. "Every person who enters any [of the enumerated
enclosures] with the intent to commit grand or petit larcency or any
felony is guilty of burglary."
Idaho Code § 18-1401 (Supp. 1965). "Every person who enters any[of the
enumerated enclosures] with intent to commit grand or petit larceny
or any felony, is guilty of burglary."
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.19.020 (Sept. 1956). "Every person who, with intent
to commit some crime therein shall . . . enter . . . or break and enter
. . . any building or part thereof . . . is guilty of burglary in the second
degree . . . ."
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It is appellants' contention that as a matter of law
there was insufficient evidence to convict appellant
of burglary because it was not directly proved that
he had the intent to commit larceny or any other
felony, and since nothing was found missing or stolen from the building, the jury could reasonably
find, especially in view of his drinking, that he had
entered for an innocent purpose. The answer to that
is that the jury did not so find. Nor can it be said
as a matter of law that from all the facts and circumstances in this case a jury could not reasonably
find beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary intent to commit larceny or any other felony. [Emphasis Added].

Thus it is clear that the mere fact that appellants
had entered the building in question during the
nighttime would support and justify a jury verdict
of guilty. Moreover, it is significant that our statute
does not require, nor do the similar statutes of sister
jurisdictions require, that the entry be made with a
concomitant intent to commit a felony within the
building entered. Ariz. Rev, Stat. Ann.§ 13-302 (1956);
Cal. Crim. Code § 459; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-5
(1964); Idaho Code§ 18-1401 (Supp. 1965); Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. § 94-901 (Supp. 1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §
205.060 (1959). Contra, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.19.020
(Sept. 1956). Respondent submits that the proscription of the statute is designed to encompass the unlawful entry of a building in the nightime for the
purpose of using the entered building to directly
further the perpetration of a felony. People v. Wright,
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206 Cal. App. 2d 184, 23 Cal Rptr. 734 (1962)2•
State v. Charette. 98 N.H. 477, 103 A.2d 192 (1954). The
mass of evidence put on by the State clearly shows
that in addition to whatever designs the defendants
had on the Barlow Furniture Company and the Lockhart Company, they also intended to commit a felony in the Clearfield State Bank. Thus, the entry of
the Barlow Furniture Company and the Lockhart
Company was effected as an integrated, direct, necessary and immediate step in the perpetration of a
felony. Defendants propose that the evidence showing intent to "crack" the Clearfield State Bank has
an exculpatory effect with respect to the charged
burglary of the Barlow Furniture Company and the
Lockhart Company. Unfortunately, perhaps, for
them, this evidence has the opposite result. The
great volume of affirmative evidence directly bearing on the subjective intent of the appellants only
serves to further support the jury's conclusion that
the defendants did in fact enter with the "intent to
commit larceny or any other felony." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-3 (1953). They are now doubly ensnared:
The jury could reasonably infer intent from the mere
entry State v. Tellay. supra; in addition, the jury may
2 In this case, the court incisively analyzes the limited number of cases
which have dealt with this exact point, concluding: "We consider the true
rule to be that . . . the intent to commit larceny or any felony is not
confined to intent to commit the crime in the building which is entered if
the intent at the time of entry is to commit the offense in the immediate
vicinity of the place entered by defendant; if the entry is made as a means
of facilitating the commission of the theft or felony; and if the two places
are so closely connected that intent and consummation of the crime would
constitute a single and practically continuous transaction." 206 C.A.2d at
188, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
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also consider the direct evidence of the defendants'
intent. In view of this, the verdict of guilty is amply
supported by the evidence.
However, lest the ingenious and original theory
of defendants be overlooked, and the novel argument in support of the technical defense here submitted be ignored, respondents would submit the
following: Assuming that the statute requires the
intent be to commit a felony within the building
entered, in addition to the larceny shown there is
further proof in the record that the appellants committed another felony inside both the Barlow Furniture Company and the Lockhart Company, that felony being attempted first degree burglary. This is
so because "any act done with intent to commit a
crime and tending but failing to affect its commission, is an attempt to commit a crime." Utah Code
Ann.§ 76-1-30 (1953).
The defendants' acts within the Barlow Furniture Company and the Lockhart Company were
clearly acts tending but failing to affect a commission of first degree burglary. People v. Cloninger.
165 Cal. App.2d 86, 331 P.2d 441 (1958). Thus, the acts
done within these named buildings would constitute a separate felony. From this ample evidence
the jury could, and did, reasonably conclude that
the defendant's entered with the intent to commit
"larceny or any felony" therein.
CONCLUSION
It is respondent's contention that none of the
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appellants' arguments herein are meritorious. It is
clear that appellants declined an offer to remand
for further preliminary hearing, and in so doing
effectively waived any objection to errors which
may have existed at that time. Appellants cannot
now complain to this court that they were prejudiced by any action at the preliminary hearing or by
any amendment made to the information since,
when afforded the opportunity, they apparently felt
the problem was not so great as to warrant further
proceedings.

It seems incredible that appellants would come
to this court with an avalanche of evidence
showing that the entry of the buildings as recited in
the information was effected with felonious intent,
and in addition admit that the evidence is sufficient
to convict for attempted first degree burglary (Brief
of Appellant, p. 4), and yet submit the argument to
this court that the evidence is insufficient to show a
lesser included offense. With the mass of uncontroverted facts in the record, there is ample basis
for the jury to conclude as they did. In view of this,
respondent submits that the judgment and conviction thereon should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
Assistant Attorney General

